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ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The District Court Erred When It Granted Forbes' Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it granted Forbes' motion to dismiss,

concluding that, because Forbes had received a withheld judgment in 2003,
application of the current version of I.C. § 19-2604(3), which would not allow
dismissal of his case, violates constitutional prohibitions against the ex post facto
application of laws. (R., pp. 58-66.) The district court erred because application
of I.C. § 19-2604(3) does not violate the prohibition against the ex post facto
application of laws. Forbes asserts that the district court was correct in its ruling,
arguing both that I.C. § 19-2604 should not be applied retroactively to those who
had previously received a withheld judgment and that application of the statute to
Forbes violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. (Respondent's brief,
pp. 8-19.) The state contends that Forbes' arguments are without merit and in
light of the Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in State v. Hardwick, Docket
No. 37178-2009, Opinion No. 31 (Idaho, March 17, 2011), the district court
should be reversed.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Granted Forbes' Motion To Dismiss
Forbes' argument is threefold. First, he argues that the state has waived

any claim on appeal that the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 19-2604(3) should be
applied retroactively.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8.)

He next argues that the

2006 amendment to I. C. § 19-2604(3) should not be applied retroactively to
anyone who had been granted a withheld judgment prior to the effectiveness

1

date of the amendment. (Respondent's brief, pp. 8-11.) Finally, Forbes asserts
that application of the 2006 amendment to LC. § 19-2604(3) violates the
constitutional prohibition against the ex post facto application of laws.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 11-19.) Each of Forbes' assertions is without merit.

1.

The State Has Not Waived Any Claim On Appeal That The 2006
Amendment To LC.§ 19-2604(3) Should Be Applied Retroactively

Forbes asserts that the state has waived any claim on appeal that the
2006 amendment to LC. § 19-2604(3) should be applied retroactively.
(Respondent's brief, pp. 7-8.) Because Forbes never raised this issue to the
district court and the district court did not make its ruling on this basis, the state
was not required as appellant to even address this issue. Forbes' assertion that
the state waived an issue raised for the first time in Respondent's brief is without
merit.
Forbes initially filed the motion to dismiss in the district court. (R., pp. 5051.) In his motion, he requested the court "pursuant to the terms of his withheld
judgment and under Idaho Code§ 19-2604(1 )" to dismiss the matter and restore
his civil rights. (R., p. 51.) Forbes did not file any supporting memorandum or
brief. In its response, the state argued that application of the 2006 amendment
of I.C. § 19-2604(3) to Forbes was not an ex post facto violation. (R., pp. 52-54.)
The district court, after hearing arguments from both the state and the defense,
dismissed Forbes' case on the grounds that "I.C. § 19-2604 violates the Ex Post
Facto clause as applied to the defendant in this case." (R., p. 66.)
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Forbes' motion and response from the state below primarily addressed
whether I.C. § 19-2604(3) violated the prohibition against the ex post facto
application of laws. Likewise, the district court only ruled on whether I.C. § 192604(3) violated the prohibition against the ex post facto application of laws. 1
Whether I.C. § 19-2604(3) should, as a matter of statutory interpretation, be
applied retroactively to anyone who received a withheld judgment prior to the
effective date of its amendment is a separate issue, not previously raised or
ruled upon below. It is, in essence, an alternative basis for affirming the district
court's

decision,

raised

for the first time

in

the

Respondent's

brief.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 8-11.)
Forbes has cited no authority for the proposition that an appellant must
anticipate and address all alternative bases for a trial court's ruling.
generally Respondent's brief.)

(See

It is nonsensical to argue that every time an

alternative basis for affirming a district court's decision is raised in the
respondent's brief, that the respondent automatically prevails because the issue
was neither raised below nor argued in the appellant's brief. There is no reason
why an appellant would argue in its appellant's brief an issue neither raised nor
decided below.

For this reason, the state has not waived any claim that the

2006 amendment to LC. § 19-2604 should be applied retroactively.

In its analysis, the district court held that the statute was "retroactive in [its]
application." (R., p. 63.) This finding was made, however, in the context of an ex
post facto analysis and not in a separate statutory construction analysis. (See,
R., pp. 61-66.)
1
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2.

The 2006 Amendment To I.C. § 19-2604 Is Not Retroactive And
May Be Applied To Forbes

Forbes asserts that the amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 should not be given
retroactive effect to those who had previously been granted a withheld judgment
prior to the effectiveness date of the amendment. (Respondent's brief, pp. 8-11.)
Forbes' assertion is erroneous because a retroactive analysis is inapplicable in
this case.
"A retrospective or retroactive law is one which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes
a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or
considerations already past." Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Transp. 147 Idaho 257,
262, 207 P.3d 988, 993 (2009). !n Idaho, a statute is not applied retroactively
unless there is clear legislative intent to that effect.

Id.

"However, in the

absence of an express declaration of legislative intent, a statute, which is
remedial or procedural in nature, and which does not create, enlarge, diminish,
or destroy contractual or vested rights, is generally held not to be retroactive,
even though it was enacted subsequent to the events to which it applies."

!sl

A remedial law is one which pertains to or affects a remedy, as
distinguished from a statute which affects or modifies a substantive right or duty.
Blacks Law Dictionary 1293 (6 th ed. 1990), citing Perkins v. Willamette
Industries, Inc., 542 P.2d 473 (Or. 1975). Because I.C. § 19-2604 merely offers
a remedy for certain individuals who have been convicted of a crime, it is a
remedial statute. See also State v. Hanes, 139 Idaho 392, 394, 79 P.3d 1070,
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1072 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that expungement is an "extraordinary remedy."
(emphasis added)).
Further, because the statute does not "create, enlarge, diminish, or
destroy contractual or vested rights" it is "held not [to] be retroactive." Wheeler,
147 Idaho at 262, 207 P.3d at 993. Because Forbes did not have contractual or
vested rights in the statute as it existed at the time that he pied guilty, it is "held
not [to] be retroactive" as applied to him. See State v. Koester, 127 P.3d 784,
786 (Wash. App. 2006) (holding that "eligibility to vacate a record is not a
substantive right, but a period of legislative grace that is subject to the control of
the legislature until all of the conditions are satisfied. Unless all of the conditions
have been met, and vesting has occurred, the legislature may change the
remedy granted by the statute."); Euclid v. Sattler, 756 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio App. 8
Dist., 2001) ("A right cannot be regarded as vested in the constitutional sense
unless it amounts to something more than an expectation of a future benefit or
interest.").
Because I.C. § 19-2604(3) is a remedial law rather than a substantive law,
and because Forbes had no vested interest in the statute as it existed at the time
that he was sentenced, the application of the law to him is not retroactive. This
court should apply the law as it existed at the time that Forbes filed his motion to
dismiss and hold that I.C. § 19-2604 is not retroactive as applied to him.
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3.

Application Of The 2006 Amendment To I.C. § 19-2604 To Forbes
Does Not Violate The Constitutional Prohibition Against The Ex
Post Facto Application Of Laws

As previously discussed in Respondent's brief, application of the 2006
amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 to Forbes does not violate the constitutional
prohibition against the ex post facto application of laws.
The recent case of State v. Hardwick, Docket No. 37178-2009, Opinion
No. 31 (Idaho, March 17, 2011 ), is dispositive. Hardwick pied guilty to enticing
children over the internet in February 2005, was granted a withheld judgment,
and was placed on probation for five years. Hardwick, Slip. op. at p. 1. In 2009,
Hardwick moved to terminate his probation, withdraw his guilty plea, and to have
the case dismissed.

kl at p.

2. The district court denied the motion based upon

the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 and held that the amendment did not
violate the ex post facto clauses of either the state or federal constitutions.

kl

On appeal, Hardwick argued that the amendment increased the punishment for
his crime and thus constituted an ex post facto violation.
Supreme Court disagreed.

kl

at p. 3. The Idaho

It held that the 2006 amendment was nonpunitive,

and therefore it was not an ex post facto violation.

kl at p.

5.

Like Hardwick, Forbes was granted a withheld judgment prior to the
amendment to I.C. § 19-2604. Like Hardwick, Forbes moved to have his case
dismissed after I.C. § 19-2604 was amended, contending that application of the
amendment to him constituted punishment and was an ex post facto violation.
And like Hardwick, application of the amendment to Forbes is not punishment
and, thus, is not an ex post facto violation.
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For these reasons, Forbes' arguments are unavailing and the district court
erred in concluding that application of the amendment to I.C. § 19-2604(3)
violated ex post facto prohibitions.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
order granting Forbes' motion to dismiss.

DATED this 28th day of March 2011.
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